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Abstract
Models are a principle instrument of modern science. They are
built, applied, tested, compared, revised and interpreted in an ex-
pansive scientific literature. Throughout this paper, I will argue that
models are also a valuable tool for the philosopher of science. In
particular, I will discuss how the methodology of Bayesian Networks
can elucidate two central problems in the philosophy of science. The
first thesis I will explore is the variety-of-evidence thesis, which argues
that the more varied the supporting evidence, the greater the degree
of confirmation for a given hypothesis. However, when investigated
using Bayesian methodology, this thesis turns out not to be sacro-
sanct. In fact, under certain conditions, a hypothesis receives more
confirmation from evidence that is obtained from one rather than more
instruments, and from evidence that confirms one rather than more
testable consequences of the hypothesis. The second challenge that I
will investigate is scientific theory change. This application highlights
a different virtue of modeling methodology. In particular, I will ar-
gue that Bayesian modeling illustrates how two seemingly unrelated
aspects of theory change, namely the (Kuhnian) stability of (normal)
science and the ability of anomalies to over turn that stability and lead
to theory change, are in fact united by a single underlying principle,
in this case, coherence. In the end, I will argue that these two exam-
ples bring out some metatheoretical reflections regarding the following
questions: What are the differences between modeling in science and
modeling in philosophy? What is the scope of the modeling method
in philosophy? And what does this imply for our understanding of
Bayesianism?
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1 Introduction
Philosophers of science want to understand how science works. We want to
know, for example, how scientific theories and models are confirmed, how
evidence for or against a theory is evaluated, how different theories hang
together, and how changes in scientific theory can be understood philosophi-
cally. Questions like these have been discussed extensively over the years, and
a look at the literature shows that two main approaches can be identified. On
the one hand, we find scholars who formulate and defend grand normative
accounts that are then used to reconstruct and, sometimes, criticize what sci-
entists have been doing. Popper’s falsificationism and its influence especially
on the development of the social sciences is a case in point. Bayesianism
is another. On the other hand, we find so-called naturalized philosophers
of science who examine, often in great detail and inspired by the work of
Thomas S. Kuhn and others, specific episodes from the history of science
and from contemporary science from a philosophical perspective and give us
a much more realistic picture of science and its workings than, for example,
the one that Popper and Bayes gave us (see Giere (1988)).
Grand approaches often run into problems when confronted with episodes
from real science. Popper’s falisificationism, for example, is arguably chal-
lenged by the existence of Kuhnian normal science, and Bayesianism has
not gone much beyond explaining a few simple features of scientific theoriz-
ing. But naturalized accounts are not without their problems either. Most
importantly, they fail to provide generalizable insights as well as normative
standards that help us to separate good science from bad science and, per-
haps, science from non-science. In short, while grand approaches tend to be
“too far away” from real science, naturalized accounts are “too close” to it.
An acceptable account has to be located somewhere in the middle and sat-
isfy the following two conditions: (i) It should be normative and provide a
defensible general account of scientific rationality. (ii) It should be “empir-
ically adequate” and provide a framework to illuminate “intuitively correct
judgments in the history of science and explain the incorrectness of those
judgments that seem clearly intuitively incorrect (and shed light on ‘grey
cases’)”, as John Worrall (2000: 32) once put it. The goal of this paper
is to formulate, illustrate and defend such an account, which will include
normative as well as descriptive elements.
To achieve this goal I propose to mimic what I take to be successful scientific
methodology: the construction of models within the framework of a theory.
The theory, in my case Bayesianism, will provide the normative framework,
while the models include additional assumptions about the specific situation
at hand. To motivate my approach, I’ll start off in Section 2 by pointing out
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some of the merits of modeling in science. Section 3 outlines and criticizes
Textbook Bayesianism, a version of Bayesianism that I will later, in Section
7, replace with Naturalized Bayesianism. Before, however, I will introduce
in Section 4 my main modeling tool, the machinery of Bayesian networks,
and present two examples of how the modeling methodology can be applied
in philosophy of science in Sections 5 and 6. I’ll conclude with some general
reflections regarding the scope and value of philosophical modeling (Section
8).
2 Modeling in Science
Models are widely used in the sciences as well as in the teaching of science.
Already in high school, students are acquainted with several models such as
the model of a pendulum and Bohr’s model of the atom. Later, at university,
one learns about various so-called standard models such as the Standard Big
Bang Model and the Standard Model of Particle Physics. And if we look at
the frontiers of science, we find researchers such as Harvard’s acclaimed physi-
cist Lisa Randall studying remarkably idealized models in order to answer
the most fundamental questions about the nature of space and time (regard-
ing, for example, the dimensionality of spacetime). One of Randall’s goals
is to get hints as to what a Theory of Everything might look like (Randall
2005). Similarly, researchers in other disciplines such as biology, psychology
and economics almost exclusively use models, along with experimentation,
as a tool to learn something about the objects or systems under investiga-
tion. It is this ubiquity of models – as opposed to theories – in science that
led philosophers of science to shift the focus of their attention from theories,
which dominated the discussion from Logical Empiricism onwards, to models
over the last twenty five years (see Frigg and Hartmann 2006, Morgan and
Morrison 1999).1 But why are models so popular in science?
Before addressing this question, a word is in order about what a model ac-
tually is and how theories and models differ from each other. A look into
science texts is not of much help here as scientists often use the terms “the-
ory” and “model” interchangeably. The Standard Model of Particle Physics,
which many consider to be our most fundamental theory, is a case in point.
So how can one distinguish between theories and models? While there is
no clear-cut difference in the use of the words “theory” and “model”, sci-
entific theories, such as Newtonian Mechanics or Quantum Mechanics, are
associated with predicates like ‘general’, ‘abstract’, and ‘universal in scope’.
1Patrick Suppes was one of the pioneers of this development. See Suppes (1960, 1962)
and Suppes (2002: ch. 2) for a more recent discussion.
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Moreover, theories are meant to not involve idealizations (although many,
if not all, of them do). On a more practical level, theories are often hard
to solve. Take quantum chromodynamics (QCD), which is a part of the
Standard Model of Particle Physics and considered to be the fundamental
theory of strong interactions. QCD cannot be solved analytically, not even
approximately, in the regime of low energies where many nuclear phenomena
occur. This, of course, does not stop physicists from exploring the physics of
atomic nuclei and their constituents. Instead of solving QCD directly, they
construct easier-to-solve alternatives such as effective field theories or models
such as the MIT Bag Model (Hartmann 1999). I have argued in (Hartmann
2001) that each of these accounts provides us with an understanding of some
aspect of a complex phenomenon, though none of them tells us the whole
story.
But models do not only have a practical advantage over theories. They are
also more intuitive, visualizable, and ideally capture the essence of a phe-
nomenon in a few assumptions. This is why models are sometimes compared
with caricatures. Unlike theories, models, such as the model of the pendu-
lum or the MIT Bag Model, are specific and limited in scope. Moreover,
they clearly involve idealizations, and it does not do any harm, at least for
the purpose for which the model was constructed, that some of the model
assumptions are strictly speaking false. Planets, for example, are of course
not point masses, and yet, our models of the planetary system work perfectly
fine with this apparently crude idealization.
The models of the planetary system and the models of a pendulum are ex-
amples of what is called a model of a theory. They are embedded into a
scientific theory, here Newtonian Mechanics, which functions as a modeling
framework. Note that Newtonian Mechanics can hardly be tested without
the specification of a model (i.e., in this case, the specification of a force
function plus assumptions about the geometry of the system etc.). However,
not all scientific theories are modeling frameworks, and not all models are
models of a theory. Sometimes the word “theory” is used with the mean-
ing “fundamental model” (as in the Standard Model of Particle Physics),
and many scientific models are not embedded into a theory. These models
are called phenomenological models, and Bohr’s Model of the atom and the
MIT Bag Model are good illustrations of this type. Some of the assumptions
made in a phenomenological model may be inspired by a scientific theory
(such as Newtonian Mechanics or QCD), while others may even contradict
an accepted theory.
To sum up, there are two types of theories – theories as modeling frameworks
and fundamental models – and two types of models – models of a theory and
phenomenological models – in science. In the remainder, I’ll focus on theories
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as modeling frameworks and models of a theory (and will present my own
Bayesian account of what a scientific theory is in Section 6.1).
Unlike their colleagues in the sciences, many philosophers are exclusively
concerned with the construction of what one could call theories – universal
claims that are typically criticized or refuted by other philosophers who will
then, in turn, put forward another universal claim, and so on. While such
a sequence of seemingly non-converging universal claims may lead to some
insight (we learn, at least, what does not work!), I submit that we can some-
times do better. More specifically, I suggest to follow Lisa Randall’s lead
and construct models also in philosophy. Similarly to many philosophers,
Randall addresses some of the most fundamental questions one can ask, yet
she does so by constructing and analyzing models, which may help her to
explain phenomena and systematize existing regularities. It may also point
the way to a more fundamental theory.
Before applying the modeling methodology to questions in the philosophy of
science, however, a disclaimer or two is in order. Models are not always the
preferred tool of the philosopher – there is a lot of space for the traditional
analytic method – but there is no reason to exclude the modeling methodol-
ogy from the toolbox of philosophy. Just as good scientists use many tools
and continually learn about new ones, philosophers can profit from expanding
their toolbox as well. This is what philosophers such as Brian Skyrms and
Clark Glymour have been doing. While Skyrms applies evolutionary game
theory to learn about the social contract and the evolution of cooperation
(Skyrms 1996), Glymour and his colleagues use Bayesian network models to
“discover” causes from statistical data (Spirtes et al. 2000). Following their
lead, I will show that modeling can also be applied in the methodology of
science. To do so, one can choose from a variety of modeling frameworks
ranging from various applied logics, game theory, and Bayesianism to alter-
natives to probability theory such as Dempster-Shafer theory. All of these
frameworks have their value and can be used to address many interesting
problems. In this paper, though, I will focus exclusively on the construction
and analysis of Bayesian network models.
3 Textbook Bayesianism
Bayesianism is a quantitative confirmation theory that was developed in
the middle of the last century in light of the problems (such as the Raven
Paradox) that qualitative theories of confirmation (such as hypothetico-
deductivism) face. While qualitative theories formulate criteria that inform
us whether or not a piece of evidence E confirms a hypothesis H, quantitative
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theories of confirmation also tell us how much E confirms H. Clearly, learn-
ing that the butler owns a Smith and Wesson, that he had an affair with the
victim’s wife and that he was in the castle when the count was murdered con-
firms the hypothesis that he was the murderer more than learning only that
he was in the castle when the murder happened. A quantitative theory of
confirmation accounts for this difference and assigns degrees of confirmation.
Bayesianism is the most developed and most popular quantitative theory of
confirmation. According to Bayesianism, scientists have subjective degrees of
belief about certain hypotheses and, as rational agents, change their degrees
of belief in the light of new evidence. These degrees of belief have to obey
the axioms of probability theory, as several arguments aim at showing. The
most popular of these arguments are the so-called Dutch book arguments,
which demonstrate that any violation of the axioms of probability theory will
necessarily lead to a loss of money of an agent in a betting situation (see,
e.g., Skyrms 1999). So we have to make sure that our degrees of belief obey
the axioms of probability theory (or are coherent) if we do not want to loose
money. Coherence is a rather weak requirement, but it is a requirement all
the same, and it makes Bayesianism a normative philosophical theory. Unlike
naturalized philosophies of science, which identify scientific rationality with
the practice of good scientists (assuming that they never err), Bayesianism
formulates constraints on the beliefs of a scientist.
Confirmation, then, amounts to this for the Bayesian: A scientist starts
with a subjective degree of belief that a certain hypothesis H is true. This
degree of belief is called the prior probability of the hypothesis: It is denoted
by P (H). The prior probability is informed by the scientist’s background
knowledge and the assignment may differ from scientist to scientist. If H is
the proposition “The patient has tuberculosis”, then doctors will typically
fix P (H) by drawing on statistical (i.e. frequentist) data, provided that such
data is available. Differing assignments may be made as long as they are
coherent. In the next step, a piece of evidence, E, say a positive result of
an X-ray scan, comes in. E prompts an update of the probability of H and
the scientist assigns a posterior probability Pnew(H). E confirms H if the
posterior probability Pnew(H) is greater than the prior probability P (H), and
E disconfirms (or falsifies) H if the posterior is smaller than the prior.
But how are probabilities updated? How do we get from a prior probability
of the hypothesis P (H) to the posterior probability Pnew(H)? There is a
lot of debate about this question amongst Bayesians and there is clearly no
consensus. Many, however, hold that the new probability measure should be
the conditionalized old probability measure:
Pnew(H) := P (H|E) (1)
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I’ll not defend this choice, but will use it in the remainder. Note, however,
that this choice is not dictated by mathematics. What is dictated by mathe-
matics is how one evaluates the expression on the right hand side of eq. (1).
Applying Bayes’ Theorem to the right hand side of eq. (1), one obtains
Pnew(H) =
P (E|H)P (H)
P (E)
, (2)
according to which the posterior probability of H is proportional to the prior
probability P (H) and the likelihood P(E|H), i.e. the probability that the
evidence obtains given that the hypothesis is true, and inversely proportional
to the expectancy P (E) of the evidence.
Textbook Bayesianism, as presented in Howson and Urbach (2006) and Ear-
man (1992), uses eq. (2) to account for a number of methodological rules. To
make things easy, let’s assume that the evidence is deductive, i.e. that E can
be deduced from H. This assumption often holds in science.2 For example,
if we want to confirm the hypothesis that all metals conduct electricity, we
deduce from this hypothesis that a certain piece of copper conducts electric-
ity. Whether or not this obtains in an experiment confirms or disconfirms H.
If E is deductive evidence for H, then the likelihood is P (E|H) = 1 and our
updating rule reduces to
Pnew(H) = P (H)/P (E). (3)
Eq. (3) shows that surprising (i.e. unexpected) evidence confirms a hypoth-
esis better than expected evidence for, if E is surprising, then P (E) is small
and hence 1/P (E) is large. And so Pnew(H) is large as well.
The updating rule can also account for the claim that more varied evidence
confirms better than less varied evidence. This is the variety-of-evidence
thesis, which is, or so it seems, a truism of scientific theorizing. Let us, for
example, drop a rock drop 25 times in a row and measure the time it takes
it to hit the ground. This procedure is expected to confirm Newtonian Me-
chanics less than a more diverse collection of evidence, such as letting the
rock drop only once, doing a pendulum experiment in London, another one
on the moon, observing the orbits of various planets, etc. A way to proof the
variety-of-evidence thesis in the Bayesian framework starts with the following
explication: more varied evidence is less correlated evidence. Correlation can
then, in turn, be explicated probabilistically. Let E = E1 ∧E2 ∧ · · · ∧En and
expand P (E) = P (E1)P (E2|E1)P (E3|E1,E2) . . . P (En|E1, . . . ,En−1), which
2Paul Teller reminds me on Duhem’s insight of the importance of background assump-
tions B. He is right. To account for this, I suggest to use a probability measure that takes
B implicitly into account, i.e. to use P (·) := P ∗(·|B) instead of P ∗(·|B).
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follows from the axioms of probability theory and the definition of condi-
tional probability. Obviously, P (E) is small if the conditional probabilities
in this product are small, and this is exactly the case if the different pieces of
evidence are not much correlated (or even anti-correlated) probabilistically.
And again, if P (E) is small, then Pnew(H) is large, which proofs that more
varied evidence confirms a hypothesis better than less varied evidence, i.e.
the variety-of-evidence thesis.
To conclude, then, Textbook Bayesianism explains some apparent truisms
about the methodology of science. I’d like to argue, however, that Textbook
Bayesianism is too general as it does not take into account empirical con-
straints such as dependencies between partially reliable measurement instru-
ments in the discussion of the variety-of-evidence thesis. Moreover, Textbook
Bayesianism has an overly-simplistic account of a scientific theory. Theories
are complex and highly interrelated objects, and scientists typically only test
parts of a theory while the rest of the theory is only indirectly confirmed.
This complexity can hardly be captured by a single proposition H that is
correlated, as a whole, with a piece of evidence E.
While this version of Textbook Bayesianism is too general, there is another
version that is too specific. The philosopher of science Jon Dorling gives
Bayesian reconstructions of specific episodes in the history of science (Dor-
ling 1979). To do so, he estimates probability values of various hypotheses,
based on what he knows about the knowledge people had at a certain time
and concludes, after having done the calculations, that the scientists were
justified to consider a certain hypothesis (e.g. a gas law) as confirmed by
the available evidence. Although I think that such results are interesting,
Dorling’s version of Textbook Bayesianism is, in the end, too specific. We do
not learn much in general about the methodology of science and to engage
in a debate about specific probability values seems, despite Dorling’s efforts,
somewhat arbitrary.
To sum up: We need a version of Bayesianism that is not too general (to
connect to the practice of science) and not too specific (to gain philosophical
insight). It would also be nice to have an account that has a somewhat
wider scope, i.e. an account that reaches beyond confirmation theory. I’ll
show that the use of modeling techniques within the Bayesian framework will
meet these desiderata. Models help bridge the gap between a general theory
(here: Bayesianism) and the scientific practice. I’ll take Bayesianism as a
modeling framework just as Newtonian Mechanics is a modeling framework.
It has to be supplemented by model assumptions if one wants to apply it to
real cases. I will show that these models explain features such as the stability
of normal science and help challenge widely held methodological views such
as the variety-of-evidence thesis.
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4 Bayesian Networks
The theory of Bayesian networks was developed by Judea Pearl and his col-
leagues at UCLA in the early 1980s, building on results by Philip Dawid and
Wolfgang Spohn on conditional independence structures (Pearl 1988). The
main goal of the theory of Bayesian networks is to provide an efficient graph-
ical representation of a joint probability distribution over a large number of
variables and to develop algorithms to compute functions of the joint prob-
ability distribution. To reduce the complexity of the problem, Bayesian net-
works encode knowledge about probabilistic independencies that hold among
the variables. They play an important role in expert systems and are used
in many parts of science, engineering and medicine where inferences have to
be drawn on the basis of complex though uncertain information.
Medical inferences are a good case to illustrate Bayesian networks. Let’s
assume that we want to test whether a patient has a certain disease (say,
tuberculosis) by making an X-ray scan. A representation of the testing sit-
uation has to take into account that the X-ray machine is only partially
reliable. It will sometimes tell us that the patient has the disease when he
in fact does not have it (a false positive), and it will sometimes not give us
a positive report when the patient does have the disease (a false negative).
Let’s represent the situation by two binary propositional variables T and X
(in italics). The positive instantiation of T – T (in roman script) – represents
the proposition “Patient has tuberculosis”, and the negative instantiation ¬T
stands for “Patient does not have tuberculosis”. Similarly, X stands for “We
obtain a positive X-ray report”, and ¬X stands for “We obtain a negative
X-ray report”. We know from statistical data that P (T) = .01 (i.e. that
1% of the patients who undertake an X-ray scan have tuberculosis) and that
the likelihoods P (X|T) = .95 (corresponding to a false negative rate of 5%)
and P (X|¬T) = .02 (corresponding to a false positive rate of 2%). We can
then calculate the probability that the patient has tuberculosis, given that
we obtained a positive X-ray report. To determine the posterior, we apply
Bayes’ Theorem,
P (T|X) = P (X|T)P (T)
P (X)
, (4)
and the law of total probability,
P (X) = P (X|T)P (T) + P (X|¬T)P (¬T), (5)
and obtain, after plugging in the numbers, that P (T|X) is .32, i.e. 32%.
This situation can be represented by the Bayesian network in figure 1. The
two nodes represent the propositional variables X and T and the arrow in-
dicates that there is a direct probabilistic dependence between them. This
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Figure 1: A Bayesian network with two nodes
dependence is sometimes read causally, but this is not necessary for our
purposes. Nodes with only outgoing arrows are called root nodes or nodes
without a parent, all other nodes are child nodes. A Bayesian network, then,
is a directed acyclic graph (dag, for short) with a probability distribution
defined over it. To fully specify the probability distribution of a Bayesian
network, we have to assign prior probabilities of all root nodes (here only the
propositional variable T ), and conditional probabilities of all other (child)
nodes given all instantiations of their parents. In our case, we have to assign
P (X|T) and P (X|¬T). With this information at hand, the Bayesian network
is fully specified and we can use various algorithms to calculate, for example,
P (T|X).
Clearly, the machinery of Bayesian networks is not required to deal with
a case as simple as the present one. In real life, however, the situation is
often much more complicated and more variables are involved. Lauritzen
and Spiegelhalter (1988) give the following illustration that is known under
the name “Asia example” in the literature. The network in figure 2 depicts
a whole range of interrelated habits, diseases and symptoms. Given the
probabilistic information encoded in the network, it is now not any longer
possible to easily draw inferences like the one we drew for the two-node
Bayesian network.
A Bayesian network encodes probabilistic information in an intuitive way;
we see immediately which nodes are directly related, and we can read off
conditional independencies by using the Parental Markov Condition that is
built in the Bayesian network:
(PMC) A variable represented by a node in a Bayesian network
is independent of all variables represented by it non-descendent
nodes in the Bayesian network, conditional on all variables rep-
resented by its parents.
Applying PMC, we can, for example, read off the Asia network that “lung
cancer?” (L) is independent of “bronchitis?” (B) given their common cause
“smoking?” (S), or, symbolically L ⊥B|S. Bayesian networks also have the
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Figure 2: A more complicated Bayesian network
practical advantage, in that only a small number of probabilities have to be
specified. Remember that 2n − 1 probabilities have to be fixed in order to
fully specify the joint distribution over n binary variables. In a Bayesian
network, we only have to specify the prior probabilities of all root nodes, and
the conditional probabilities of all child nodes. This reduces the numbers
considerably and makes much more complex situations manageable. For in-
stance, in the Asia example, the knowledge about conditional independencies
reduces the number of probabilities that have to be specified from 255 to 18
– an enormous reduction indeed.
The construction of a Bayesian network model proceeds in four steps: First,
identify the set of all relevant variables. Second, specify all conditional inde-
pendencies that hold between these variables. Third, construct a dag that in-
corporates these conditional independencies. Fourth, specify the prior prob-
abilities of all root nodes and the conditional probabilities of all child nodes.
Once all this is done, the joint probability distribution over the variables is
specified and any probability of interest can be computed. Let’s apply this
methodology to problems from the philosophy of science.
5 Example 1: The Variety-of-Evidence The-
sis
Let’s return to the already mentioned variety-of-evidence thesis and ask
whether the thesis holds in general or whether it has exceptions. Are there
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Figure 3: A Bayesian network representing the test of a hypothesis with a
partially reliable instrument
testing scenarios in which less varied evidence confirms a hypothesis more
than more varied evidence?3
To test the variety-of-evidence thesis, let’s assume that hypothesis H was
positively tested by an instrument I1 and consider two options for a second
test. In option 1, a different instrument I2 is used to test the hypothesis.
In this case, the second test is independent of the first test. In option 2, I1
is used again, which renders the two tests dependent. Clearly, the variety-
of-evidence thesis suggests that option 1 is to be preferred as the posterior
probability of the hypothesis after two positive test reports will presumably
be greater for independent tests than for dependent tests. Following our
methodology, we construct a model to find out if this is the case.
To warm up, let’s consider the test of a hypothesis H with one partially reli-
able instrument. Our model has three binary propositional variables: (i) H
represents the hypothesis and has the instantiations H (hypothesis holds) and
¬H (hypothesis does not hold). (ii) E represents the evidence and has the
instantiations E (evidence obtains) and ¬E (evidence does not obtain). (iii)
R represents the reliability of the instrument and has the instantiations R
(instrument is reliable) and ¬R (instrument is not reliable). E is dependant
on H and R, but H and R are independent (in symbols: H ⊥R). This makes
sense, for the truth value of the hypothesis does not depend on the reliability
of the instrument. We can now construct a Bayesian network that incorpo-
rates these assumptions (see figure 3). Finally, we have to specify the prior
probabilities of all root nodes (H and R) and the conditional probabilities of
all child nodes (E). We set
P (H) = h , P (R) = ρ. (6)
3This section follows Bovens and Hartmann (2004), ch. 4.
12
P
*(
H
yp
)
Figure 4: The posterior probability that the hypothesis (HYP) is true as a
function of the reliability parameter ρ when the randomization parameter is
set at a = .5 (full line), a = .2 (dotted line) and a = .9 (dashed line) and
P (H) = .6.
Specifying the conditional probabilities of E is a bit harder as we have to
make assumptions about the reliability of the instrument. To keep things
simple, we assume that the instrument is a truth-teller if it is in the reliable
mode (i.e. if R is instantiated), and a randomizer, if it is in the unreliable
mode (i.e. if ¬R is instantiated). So we set:
P (E|H,R) = 1 , P (E|¬H,R) = 0
P (E|H,¬R) = a , P (E|¬H,¬R) = a (7)
a is called the randomization parameter. Note that the probability of E does
not depend on whether H is true or not if the instrument is in the unreliable
mode. This way of modeling a partially reliable instrument is clearly a strong
idealization, which will not hold in many cases.
Applying the machinery of Bayesian networks, we can now calculate the
posterior probability P (H|E) of the hypothesis after receiving a piece of ev-
idence. The result is plotted in figure 4. We see that the posterior equals
the prior if ρ = 0, which renders the test to be useless. Conversely, if ρ = 1,
the posterior is 1, i.e., if God tells us that the evidence obtains, then the
hypothesis must be true. For values of the reliability parameter in between 0
and 1, the posterior is an increasing function of ρ, with the slope depending
on the randomization parameter a.
Let’s now generalize this simple model to the more complicated case of two
tests of a hypothesis. Our two testing options can be represented by the
Bayesian networks depicted in figures 5 and 6. The network in figure 5 models
testing option 1, i.e. repeated testing with two dependent instruments, as
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Figure 5: A Bayesian network representing the test of a hypothesis with two
independent instruments
Figure 6: A Bayesian network representing the test of a a hypothesis with
two dependent instruments
there is only one reliability node R that connects the two report nodes.
E1 and E2 are conditionally dependent on each other: P (E1,E2|H,R) 6=
P (E1|H,R)P (E2|H,R). The Bayesian network in figure 6 represents testing
option 2. Now, each evidence node has its own reliability node (R1 or R2,
respectively), and the two tests are conditionally independent of each other:
E1 ⊥E2|H.4
We apply the methodology of Bayesian networks and calculate the posterior
probability P (H|E1,E2) for the two cases. Let P1 be the probability measure
for the case of independent instruments, and P2 be the probability measure
for the case of dependent instruments. This probability will depend on the
parameters a, h, and ρ which we assume to have the same values in both cases
(without this ceteris paribus clause it would not make sense to compare the
4This independence follows from the d−separation criterion, which is explained, for
instance, in Pearl (1988). Applying PMC, we only get E1 ⊥E2|H,R1 and E2 ⊥E1|H,R2.
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∆P < 0
∆P > 0
Figure 7: Phase plot illustrating Theorem 1.
two scenarios). To find out which testing option leads to more confirmation
(i.e. to a higher posterior probability), we calculate the difference of the
posteriors and ask when this difference is positive. The following theorem
holds:
Theorem 1 Let ∆P = P1(H|E1,E2)− P2(H|E1,E2), with P1 and P2 as de-
fined in the text. Then ∆P > 0, if and only if 1− 2(1− a)(1− ρ) > 0.5
The phase plot in figure 7 illustrates this result. Below the phase curve in the
ρ−a diagram, the posterior probability for two tests with the same instrument
is higher. For parameter pairs (a, ρ) above the phase curve, two independent
tests result in a greater posterior probability, i.e. in more confirmation.
Do these findings make sense? Our model clearly makes a lot of idealizing
assumptions and it is hence not clear at all whether we should accept what it
tells us. Without a story that makes the consequences of the model plausible,
the model clearly belongs in the waste bin. So let’s try to understand our
findings.
Obviously two conflicting intuitions are at work here. On the one hand,
independence is a good thing. We are impressed by two positive reports from
independent instruments. On the other hand, coherent test results from a
single instrument increase our confidence in the reliability of the instrument.
And this, in turn, increases our degree of confidence in the truth of the
hypothesis.
5The proof of the theorem can be found in Bovens and Hartmann (2004: 144).
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To sum up: Our model shows that the variety-of-evidence thesis is not sacro-
sanct. It can fail, and it does indeed fail under certain conditions. The model
points to the existence of these cases, and it makes plausible why the thesis
fails in these cases. It acts like a midwife as it helps us to discover a new
feature and it leaves us with the job of making this new feature plausible.
Ideally, we are able to tell a model-independent story that makes the results
of the model plausible. While this works sometime, it does not fully work
in this case as the details of the modeling of the partial reliability of the
instruments matters for the story.
6 Example 2: Theories and Normal Science
Scientific theories change over time. Sometimes a theory is completely given
up (as the phlogiston theory in chemistry), and sometimes (and presumably
more often) elements of the old theory are carried over to the successor theory.
This holds especially for science in the last one hundred years. But which
elements are carried over depends on the specific case in question and I do
not think that something general (such that only ‘structures’ survive theory
change) can be said here (see Hartmann (2002)).
So the question arises whether a philosophical account of scientific theory
change can be given. So far, the philosophical debate has largely been cen-
tered around the question as to whether a rational reconstruction of scientific
theory change can be given or not. Challenged by Kuhn and Feyerabend,
who stressed radical changes (so called scientific revolutions), quasi-religious
conversion from one paradigm to another, and incommensurability, many
philosophers have attempted to present a rational reconstruction of scientific
theory change tout cour. They aimed at replacing Kuhn’s grand approach
by another grand approach and I think that this is too fast.
Instead I suggest to aim at explaining empirically established aspects of sci-
entific theory change in a philosophical (here: Bayesian) framework. Which
aspects become the subjects of explanation has to be determined by historical
research. The challenge, then, is to see whether such an integration of mod-
eling and empirical research can be facilitated. Note that the project I am
suggesting is in the tradition of Wesley Salmon’s programmatic article “Tom
Kuhn Meets Tom Bayes” in which Salmon attempts to reconcile Bayesianism
with the work of Thomas S. Kuhn (Salmon 1990). In this section, I want to
take a modest step in this direction by explaining one aspect of the dynam-
ics of science related to the work of Kuhn: the stability of normal science.
Before, however, a word is in order about what a scientific theory is from a
Bayesian point of view.
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6.1 What is a scientific theory?
Scientific theories such as Newtonian Mechanics and Quantum Mechanics
are highly complex and interrelated wholes. In them we find, for example,
principles, empirical assumptions, laws, and models. How are they all related,
and how are they integrated into a theory? A simple philosophical account
such as Textbook Bayesianism, which only talks about a hypothesis H and
a piece of evidence E, does not suffice to adequately address these questions
and to capture the complexity of real scientific theories.
Unfortunately, the two major accounts discussed in the philosophical liter-
ature – the syntactic view and the semantic view – do not suffice either.
According to the syntactic view, scientific theories are linguistic entities, sets
of propositions formulated in, say, first-order logic. Clearly, the linguistic for-
mulation of a theory matches well with the way scientists formulate a theory.
However, it is important to note that inductive relations between elements of
a theory cannot be captured adequately. This is a serious flaw, as inductive
relations between the elements of a theory are crucial, for example, when
it comes to assess a theory. According to the semantic view, championed
by Suppes and others, scientific theories are non-linguistic entities, and so a
theory is not equated with a specific linguistic representation. It is rather
identified with the set of models, i.e. realizations of the abstract mathemat-
ical structure of the theory. Some adherents of the semantic view, such as
Ronald Giere (1988) and the Munich structuralists, have stressed the inter-
relatedness of the models of a theory. But they lack a detailed account of
the nature and evidential relevance of these relations (cf. Ga¨hde 1996).
As we will see, the Bayesian view combines elements of the syntactic view
with elements of the semantic view while taking account of the deficiencies of
both approaches. On the Bayesian view, a scientific theory has an empirical
and a non-empirical (or heuristic) part. The non-empirical part of a scientific
theory consists of the laws and principles of the theory, which are, perhaps,
organized in an axiomatic structure. It also comprises certain tools and
tricks that are used to construct models in the framework of the theory and
assumptions about the domain of the theory. Note that the non-empirical
part includes much that is captured in Kuhn’s notoriously vague notion of a
paradigm. The non-empirical part of a theory is not probabilified.
The empirical part of a scientific theory, however, is probabilified. It is ex-
plicated as a Bayesian network. The nodes of the network represent the
models of the theory, which account for (and are confirmed by) empirical
phenomena. The models themselves are conjunctions of propositions, some
of which are instantiations of the laws included in the non-empirical part
of the theory, others are additional assumptions that have to be made to
17
Figure 8: The empirical part of a scientific theory
account for a phenomenon. A probability distribution is defined over all
model and phenomena variables, but the propositions within the model are
not probabilified. An arrow connects two models in the Bayesian network if
there is a direct probabilistic dependence between them. Such a dependence
is generated, for example, by the instantiation of the same law in both mod-
els. Consider Newtonian Mechanics. In this theory, Newton’s Second Law
is instantiated in most, if not all, models. This makes it plausible that for
any two models M1 and M2 of the theory, P (M2|M1) 6= P (M2). But there
might be other relations as well. Note that the empirical part of the theory
is a dynamical entity. It grows in the course of time as more and more mod-
els are added to the empirical part of the theory to capture more and more
phenomena.
Phenomena can relate to the models of a theory in different ways. One option
is that each model Mi is accounted for by just one phenomenon Ei and that
Ei is probabilistically independent of (and hence does not confirm) any other
model in the theory (see figure 8).6 This is a rather unrealistic assumption,
which typically does not hold. For example, it does not allow for the indirect
confirmation of a model M2 by a phenomenon E1 that is accounted for by a
6I represent phenomena by variables Ei instead of Pi to avoid confusion with the
probability measure P and to indicate that the phenomenon Ei is evidence for model Mi.
18
model M1 that is related to M2 in the network representing the empirical part
of the theory. For more on indirect confirmation, see Dietrich and Moretti
(2005). I take it to be an empirical question how models and phenomena
are related, and the corresponding Bayesian network has to be constructed
accordingly.
6.2 The stability of normal science
Kuhn observed that science is characterized by long periods of what he calls
normal science. In these periods, Kuhn provocatively wrote, it is not the sci-
entific theory that is tested, but the scientist (Kuhn 1970: 5). If a scientist is
able to solve a given problem (or a puzzle, as Kuhn put it), then she passed
the test, and if she fails to solve it, then she does not pass the test. In this
way, more and more models are added to the cluster of models that comprise,
in our reconstruction, the empirical part of a scientific theory. Phenomena
are fitted into the framework of the theory by constructing appropriate mod-
els, and typically no surprises arise. Understandably, Sir Karl Popper felt
challenged and provoked by these claims. He could not accept the apparently
uncritical attitude of scientists who do not seem to follow his conjectures-
and-refutations methodology. However, Popper admitted that Kuhn’s claims
are descriptively correct and gave up his efforts to find a rationale for the
stability of normal science (Popper 1970: 52). For Popper, scientists who act
as Kuhn describes it are simply irrational, as no critical-rationalistic justifi-
cation for the stability of normal science can be given. However, the failure to
give a Popperian justification does not entail that no epistemic justification
can be given at all. So let’s explore the prospects for a Bayesian justification.
At first sight, a Bayesian justification of the stability of normal science seems
to be hard to come by as normal science raises an immediate problem for a
probabilist. According to probability theory the probability of a conjunction
cannot be greater than the probability of one of the conjuncts. So by adding
more and more models to the empirical part of a theory, the joint probability
of all models will monotonously decrease. And this can’t be right. Let’s refer
to this problem as the conjunction problem and ask how a Bayesian can deal
with it.
To dissolve the conjunction problem, note that models are related to evi-
dence, which has to be taken into account in an assessment of a theory. Each
model Mi accounts for a phenomenon, which is, in turn, evidence Ei for the
model. We therefore have to consider conditional probabilities, not uncondi-
tional ones. It is easy to see that the conjunction problem disappears if we
conditionalize on the combined evidence, i.e. the conjunction of all relevant
Ei’s as it is a mathematical truism that P (M1,M2, . . . ,Mn|E1,E2, . . . ,En)
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can be greater than P (M1,M2, . . . ,Mn−1|E1,E2, . . . ,En−1).
So let’s conceptualize the empirical part of a theory as laid out in Section 6.1
and ask under which conditions P (M1,M2, . . . ,Mn|E1,E2, . . . ,En) is greater
than P (M1,M2, . . . ,Mn−1|E1,E2, . . . ,En−1). The answer to this question in-
volves the epistemological notion of coherence, which should not be confused
with the confirmation-theoretic notion of coherence mentioned in Section 3.
The coherence of a set of propositions informs us how well the propositions
in the set hang together. Coherence comes in degrees: some sets are more co-
herent, other are less coherent. Interestingly, we often make good judgments,
which of two sets of propositions is more coherent, without examining the
underlying probability distribution over the propositions. However, a prob-
abilistic account of coherence can be given. I shortly lay out the account
given by Bovens and Hartmann (2003, 2004). The reader may consult these
publications for details and motivation.
Let’s assume that we have a set of propositions T = {M1, . . . ,Mn} and a set
of pieces of evidence E = {E1, . . . ,En} such that the following independence
assumption holds:
Ei ⊥M1, E1, . . . ,Mi−1, Ei−1,Mi+1, Ei+1 . . . ,Mn, En|Mi for i = 1, . . . , n (8)
The Bayesian network in figure 8 incorporates this assumption. We also
assume that each model Mi is supported with the same strength by its cor-
responding evidence Ei. This strength is measured by
r := 1− P (Ei|¬Mi)/P (Ei|Mi) for all i = 1, . . . , n. (9)
Note that r ∈ (0, 1). We define ai = P (n− i propositions of T are true) for
i = 0, . . . , n and the weight vector of T by 〈a0, . . . , an−1〉. Then the posterior
probability is given by
P (M1, . . . ,Mn|E1, . . . ,En) = a0∑n
i=0 ai(1− r)i
. (10)
Moreover, Bovens and Hartmann argue that T = {M1, . . . ,Mn} is more
coherent than T ′ = {M′1, . . . ,M′m} if, for all values of r, cr(T ) > cr(T ′)
with
cr(T ) = a0 + (1− a0)(1− r)
n∑n
i=0 ai(1− r)i
. (11)
Note that cr(T ) is not a coherence measure. It is rather a function that gener-
ates a coherence quasi-ordering. It does not generate a complete ordering as
it may happen that cr(T ) > cr(T ′) for some values of r, and cr(T ) < cr(T ′)
for other values of r. In this case it is indeterminate which of the two sets is
more coherent.
20
We have now the necessary prerequisites to formulate the following theorem
(proven in the Appendix), which will be used to give an epistemic justification
for the stability of normal science.
Theorem 2 Let T = {M1, . . . ,Mn−1} and T ′ = T ∪ {Mn} be two theories
and E = {E1, . . . , En−1} and E ′ = E ∪ {En} the corresponding evidence sets.
A probability measure P is defined over {M1, . . . ,Mn,E1, . . . ,En} and the
independence assumption (8) holds. 〈a0, . . . , an−1〉 and 〈b0, . . . , bn〉 are the
weight vectors of T and T ′, and r0 := (a0−b0)/[a0(1−b0)]. Moreover, all Mi
are supported by Ei with the same strength r = 1−P (Ei|¬Mi)/P (Ei|Mi) > r0,
and T ′ is more coherent than T . Then the posterior probability of T ′ is
greater than the posterior probability of T , i.e. P (M1, . . . ,Mn|E1, . . . ,En) >
P (M1, . . . ,Mn−1|E1, . . . ,En−1) and T ′ is better confirmed by E ′ than T is by
E, if one uses the distance, ratio or likelihood measure of confirmation.
How does this theorem help us explain and justify the stability of normal
science? To address this question, let’s see if the assumptions of the theorem
are satisfied in real science. First, I take it to be empirically established that
scientific theories become increasingly coherent in the course of scientific
theorizing. The models in a theory are related to each other and support
each other. And the more models are added to the theory, the better they
will typically cohere.7 Second, in a period of normal science, all models
account for their corresponding phenomena, and it is plausible to assume
that the strength of support a model gets from a phenomenon is more or less
the same for all models. This is clearly an idealization, but I think that it
is a fairly good one. Third, as scientific theories contain a large number of
models, their prior probability does not decrease much when a new model is
added. In this case, r0 is small, and so the theorem holds for a large range
of values of r. For example, if a0 = .7 and b0 = .69, then r0 = .046. So,
according to Theorem 2, the posterior probability of T ′ is greater than the
posterior probability of T , even if the models are only minimally confirmed
by their corresponding evidence. At the same time, T ′ is better confirmed
by E ′ than T is by E . Hence, we have given an epistemic justification for
adding more and more models to a scientific theory in the course of normal
science.
7Note that this is an empirical claim that needs to be supported by case studies. The
tricky part of the argument is, of course, to relate the intuitive notion of coherence with
the form notion. Clearly, much more needs to be said about this.
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7 Naturalized Bayesianism
After having presented two examples of the modeling methodology in philos-
ophy of science, it is time to step back and lay out the general philosophical
position behind this work. I shall call this position Naturalized Bayesianism.
It combines elements of Textbook Bayesianism with findings from the natu-
ralistic approach to the philosophy of science. From Textbook Bayesianism
it takes the normative framework, which is, however, insufficient to get a full
philosophical account of scientific theorizing. It is insufficient just as New-
ton’s three laws are insufficient in mechanics. They have to be supplemented
by additional elements, such as force functions, if we want to account for
mechanical phenomena in Newtonian Mechanics.
Likewise, the normative framework of Textbook Bayesianism has to be sup-
plemented by empirical elements. These additional (modeling) assumptions
are typically inspired by generalizations from case studies, which makes Nat-
uralized Bayesianism a philosophical project that requires the competence
and the collaboration of philosophers and historians of science with a back-
ground in formal methods as well as knowledge in the history of science and
of contemporary science. Building on this combined competence, natural-
ized Bayesians can attempt to explain the regularities that we find in the
methodology of science.
8 Conclusions
I hope to have shown that the method of modeling has some value in philoso-
phy. Two functions of modeling are especially worth mentioning: (i) Models
are heuristically important. They suggest something that we might later
be able to explain in a model-independent way (as the variety-of-evidence
example shows); (ii) Models help us to explain features of science. My dis-
cussion of scientific theory change is a case in point. Models help us to deal
with more realistic (and, as it happens, more complicated) situations. When
different intuitions pull in different directions (as in the variety-of-evidence
example), the philosophical model tells us which intuition “wins” in which
part of the parameter space.
While there are many similarities between modeling in philosophy and mod-
eling in science, there are also important differences. Most important is the
issue of model assessment. Why should we believe in a philosophical model,
accept its consequences and be content with an explanation that a philosoph-
ical model provides us with? After all, unlike in science, we cannot compare
the model with “hard” data from experiments. All we have in philosophy is
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our intuitions, and all we can do is to aim at a reflexive equilibrium between
our intuitions and the consequences of the model. That is, on the one hand,
the model may correct our intuitions and make them more precise. On the
other hand, our intuitions may suggest a correction of a philosophical model.
Clearly, much more needs to be said about the assessment of philosophical
models, but I have to leave this for another occasion.
I’d like to close with a final word about Bayesianism. Naturalized Bayesian-
ism, or so I have argued, can explain some features of the methodology of
science. But can it explain all of its features, i.e. is Naturalized Bayesian-
ism a universal philosophy of science? Probably not. But it remains to be
seen how far one gets with this extremely minimal and conceptually simple
framework. And once we come across features of science that cannot be fit
into the Bayesian framework, we have to find another account.8 Just as in
science.
Appendix
To proof theorem 2, we first define a∗0 := P (M1, . . . ,Mn−1|E1, . . . ,En−1) and
b∗0 := P (M1, . . . ,Mn|E1, . . . ,En). From eqs. (10) and (11) we obtain
cr(T ) = a0 + (1− a0)(1− r)
n−1
a0
a∗0 ; cr(T ′) =
b0 + (1− b0)(1− r)n
a0
b∗0
As T ′ is more coherent than T , cr(T ′) > cr(T ) for all r ∈ (0, 1). Hence
b∗0
a∗0
>
a0b0 + (1− a0)b0(1− r)n−1
a0b0 + a0(1− b0)(1− r)n .
We conclude that b∗0/a
∗
0 > 1 if (1− a0)b0 > a0(1− b0)(1− r), i.e. if
r > r0 :=
a0 − b0
a0(1− b0) ,
which proofs the first part of the theorem.
In our notation, the distance measure d and ratio measure r of confirmation
are defined as follows:
d(T , E) := a∗0 − a0 , d(T ′, E ′) := b∗0 − b0
r(T , E) := a∗0/a0 , r(T ′, E ′) := b∗0/b0
8Some think that the Bayesian framework is too flexible and that everything can be
fit into it. I doubt that this is true. The philosophical community will not accept every
model. There are standards of model acceptance – just as in science – and it is our task
to make these standards explicit.
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Hence,
d(T ′, E ′)− d(T , E) = (b∗0 − b0)− (a∗0 − a0)
= (b∗0 − a∗0) + (a0 − b0)
and
r(T ′, E ′)/r(T , E) = b
∗
0/b0
a∗0/a0
=
b∗0
a∗0
· a0
b0
.
From b∗0 > a
∗
0 (for r > r0) and a0 > b0, we obtain that d(T ′, E ′) > d(T , E)
and r(T ′, E ′) > r(T , E).
The likelihood measure l is defined as follows:
l(T , E) := log
(
P (E1, . . . ,En−1|M1, . . . ,Mn−1)
P (E1, . . . ,En−1|¬M1, . . . ,¬Mn−1)
)
After some algebra, l(T , E) can be written in the following form:
l(T , E) = log (a∗0/(1− a∗0))− log (a0/(1− a0))
A similar expressions obtains for l(T ′, E ′). We now note that f(x) :=
log [x/(1− x)] is an increasing function of x on the interval (0, 1) and ob-
tain that l(T ′, E ′) > l(T , E), if b∗0 > a∗0 and a0 > b0. This completes the proof
of theorem 2.
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